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Delegation or Dereliction? When Governments Assign Too
Many Defense Posts to Military Officials
David Pion-Berlin
Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, USA
ABSTRACT
Sometimes democratic political leaders voluntarily cede the
armed forces too much authority, assigning them positions
that should have gone to civilians. The over-delegation of
posts to soldiers can invite problems of dependency, as civi-
lians grow accustomed to the military handling defense policy.
This study investigates the delegation of leadership positions
in six advanced democracies: Israel, Taiwan, Spain, the US, the
UK, and France. It finds that in the first three countries officers
dominate many top-tier positions within the defense minis-
tries, while in the latter three, civilians do. Deficiencies in
civilian control are unexpected since these countries either
face serious external threats or are members of NATO. It is
argued that what links the three countries with civilian defi-
ciencies is the presence of wide and longstanding gaps
between military and civilian expertise and an absence of
incentives to close them. Where civilians suffer from serious
knowledge deficits, there is often a temptation to defer to the
generals by delegating key ministerial posts to them.
KEYWORDS
delegation; civil–military
relations; defense ministry
Introduction
Democratic governments are in charge of delegating executive-branch, defense-
related responsibilities between civilian and military personnel. While all gov-
ernments depend on sage military advice to construct sensible defense plans,
sometimes political leaders rely toomuch on the armed forces by ceding to them
excessive authority, assigning them tasks and positions that should have gone to
civilians. Political leaders may do so believing that it is an easier path to fulfilling
vital functions because officers are readily available, paid for within the defense
budget, and well qualified in the realm of defense and security. But the over-
delegation of posts to soldiers also invites problems of dependency, as civilians
grow accustomed to themilitary handling defense policy. An overreliance on the
military to fill posts can persuade civilians that the armed forces provide the only
viable solution and will do so well into the future, thus completely normalizing
their dominance.
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To highlight the problem, this study investigates the delegation of leader-
ship positions within the defense ministries of six consolidated democracies:
Israel, Taiwan, Spain, the US, the UK, and France. In the first three cases we
find that officers dominate many top-tier positions within the ministries,
with civilians occupying lower rungs of the ladder. In the last three cases,
there is a much stronger presence of civilians within ministerial leadership
roles. These imbalances are not the result of military pressure, but rather
autonomous civilian preferences.
Why would excessive delegation occur? It is argued that countries whose
civilians have longstanding deficits in defense knowledge often defer to
officers with greater understandings. Deference can lead to delegation,
because those with knowledge are in better positions to command authority
and respect in the crafting of defense policy. Where the balance of compe-
tence has favored officers over long periods of time, it becomes difficult for
civilians to restore any semblance of parity, and more difficult still where
there are not sufficient incentives to build up a critical mass of well-trained
civilian defense specialists. Instead, governments will take the easier path and
allow active or retired armed forces personnel to fill ministerial posts that
could have been occupied by civilians.
What is delegation?
For this study, delegation refers to the voluntary transfer of defense-related
positions to the military. If delegation occurs, it implies that civilians in
positions of governmental leadership not only have the authority to do so,
but have done so voluntarily, uncoerced. The motivations for transfer may
vary, but they do not stem from fear or pressure generated by actions taken
by the armed forces. So this study will restrict itself to scenarios where there
are sufficient levels of civilian control in place to allow governments to
autonomously divvy up positions between civilian and military personnel.
This study focuses on ill-advised forms of delegation, where positions and
tasks could have and should have remained in the hands of civilians. This is to be
distinguished from what has been called a “normal” division of labor between
civilians and soldiers. As Huntington formulated decades ago, professional
soldiers would be relegated to strictly military matters carrying out the orders
issued by civilians.1 Civilians would formulate foreign, national security, and
defense policies, while the military would implement them.
Most contemporary scholars recognize that tasks are not so neatly divided
between civilian andmilitary, and that there is considerable overlap between the
two spheres.2 Decisions are not purely military in character, because they can
have political implications.3 Likewise, political defense decisions may necessitate
military input. Field commanders and other strategically placed officers may
need to judge the feasibility of a military course of action desired by politicians.
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As a result, civilians and officers will have to convene to discuss defense
objectives and plans. When they do so, the decision-making division of labor
can sometimes get blurred.4
That having been said, even as they invite officers into the policy discus-
sion, democratic governments must nonetheless establish clear lines of
authority if they are to secure civilian control. A delegation problem occurs
when civilians cede too many government positions to military personnel.
This over-delegation, if you will, is problematic because it situates soldiers in
positions of authority to unduly influence the crafting of overall defense
policy, strategies, planning documents, budgets, and so forth. In this sce-
nario, the military has assumed enough duties and accumulated enough
practice to place civilians at a disadvantage, one that creates a dependency
on the military that is difficult to undo.
Relying on the military to make vital defense decisions is risky, and as Feaver
argues, “would amount to a de facto coup; the military would be deciding policy
and making decisions that by rights belong to the civilian political masters.”5
This is an extreme form, where civilians thoroughly undermine their overall
control of the armed forces by ceding toomuch authority. But even less extreme,
more gradual forms of delegation are undesirable. In this scenario, though
overall political authority has not been relinquished, civilians have reassigned
defense or security-related tasks to officers alone—work that should have been
done by or at the very least should have been shared with civilians. The danger is
that such delegation becomes the new normal. As Gordon Adams and Shoon
Murray caution, the delegation is “gradual, relatively uncontested, and [appear-
ing to be] even normal and necessary to some.”6
This kind of delegation cannot be compensated for with executive over-
sight. Normally, oversight can mitigate problems posed by delegation by
assuring that military personnel do not take advantage of their positions.
Principal-agent theory tells us that though subordinate, militaries can lever-
age civilian superiors because they alone command the guns and render
defense for the nation. By virtue of their unique roles in carrying out defense
policies on the battlefield, soldiers can cloak their activities from civilian
superiors.7 They may also have preferences that diverge from those of the
political authorities, creating problems for policy implementation.
Principals normally have means to check potential challenges from below.
Through close screening of recruits and supervision of personnel, civilian
leaders can assure that soldiers fulfill the tasks they are assigned. Through
investigation, civilians can discipline or remove officers who skirt their
assignments. As Feaver points out, civilians must devise “an optimal mix of
monitoring mechanisms” that minimize the “incentives and opportunities for
the agent to flout the principal’s wishes.”8
But none of those oversight measures are relevant to this delegation
problem, one where civilians have ceded too much authority to the military
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by placing officers in leadership roles where they can act as principals within
key defense institutions. In one respect, the principal-agent relationship has
been flipped on its head, as important decision-making posts within the
ministries are occupied by officers, while subordinate positions are taken
up by civilians. For example, in the three countries under review below,
a great majority of ministerial higher-ups are military, including deputy
ministers, secretaries, and department heads. They have positions of ample
authority where they can design, shape, and direct the defense policies for the
nation. By contrast, civilians are found on lower rungs of the ministerial
ladder. Even though presidents are civilians and thus the ultimate principals
in the civil–military relationship, their ability to actually influence the craft-
ing of defense policy is attenuated when just below them is a ministerial
hierarchy dominated by military personnel.
Who would supervise these military leaders? Who would check their power?
Conceivably, the legislative branch could play that role, were it equipped to do
so. In democracies, congresses and parliaments normally should have some say
so over defense policies, with the power to legislate, oversee, and scrutinize
military activities as well as the work of executive-branch defense ministries.
Unfortunately, it is generally the case that legislative defense commissions are
poorly equipped, having neither the resources, staff, nor expertise to closely
monitor the defense sector. In a major global study of legislative defense over-
sight, Transparency International finds that 85 percent of countries have parlia-
ments or congresses that “lack effective scrutiny of their defense policies,” while
two thirds have “seriously deficient controls over their ministries of defense.9 In
sum, where military officers essentially run the show within defense ministries,
oversight is a real challenge and remains unfulfilled when legislatures cannot
perform their duties.
Potential problems in excessive delegation
As will be shown here, civilians have delegated ministerial leadership positions to
themilitary that should be granted to civilians, thus putting soldiers in positions of
authority to unduly influence the crafting of defense strategies, planning docu-
ments, and budgets. In this scenario, the military has assumed enough duties and
accumulated enough practice to have a decisive edge on knowledge regarding the
issue at hand. Civilians are at a disadvantage and continuously defer to the
military, wanting to be sure that their decisions have stable foundations. This
creates a dependency on the military that is difficult to undo.
Why is that dependency worrisome? First, civilians who might have been
employed to undertake those tasks are not, and posts within the defense
ministry go to officers. Military authorities then recruit their own, discoura-
ging civilians from even applying for ministerial jobs. Second, the military
may claim a certain ownership over the tasks and assert autonomy in this
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regard, fending off civilian efforts to influence later on. Third, to the extent
that civilians become more reliant on the military, the latter could extract
a cost for its continued work. Perceiving that dependence as a sign of
weakness, the military requests more in the way of budgeted funds, addi-
tional positions for its officers, and so on.
Fourth, military ideas could slowly diverge from civilians over time. With
greater knowledge and work experience on its side, the military will assert its
preferences in a convincing way, manipulating civilians into pursuing
a course of action that may be undesirable from a political and diplomatic
point of view. Fifth, there could also be reputational costs, when the military
perceived civilian delegation as an admission of incompetence. If civilians are
seen to not be up to a task, that could erode military respect for civilian
overseers. And, finally, it could turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. An over-
reliance on the military to fill posts and gaps in policymaking can persuade
civilians that the armed forces provide the only viable solution and will do so
well into the future, thus completely normalizing their dominance.10
A country can have political control over their security forces, and yet not
have fully operationalized that by establishing enough civilian presence within
key decision-making centers. If so, then a delegation problem may still linger. If
we were to look for such a problem, the obvious place would be the defense
ministry. The defense ministry is, according to Bruneau and Goetze, indispen-
sable for establishing civilian control. As they say: “The MOD structure has
become widely viewed as the best solution to the classic paradox, ‘Who guards
the guardians?’”11 These same authors note that one of the primary purposes of
defense ministries is to “structure the power relationships between democrati-
cally elected civilian leaders and the armed forces command.”12 If ministries are
to do their job, they should have a heavy preponderance of civilian directors,
managers, and staffers. An absence of sufficient civilian personnel poses risks for
democratic government, as follows.
The purpose of defense ministries is to prepare the armed forces to serve
the policy goals of government, and not the other way around. Should active
duty or retired military officers occupy too many top positions within the
defense sector, they may exhibit divided loyalties. While they are sworn to
serve the constitutionally elected government, they are occasionally tempted
to betray that oath by obliging the institution they were part of and loyal to
for so many years.13 Also, the defense ministry is a kind of buffer zone
between the president and the service branches, preventing military com-
manders from occupying positions too close to the executive office where
they can exert undue influence. A proper buffer means one with a sizeable
civilian presence. Civilianized institutions and leaders must be in place to
ensure that policy preferences get translated into defense actions and to stand
vigilant against military efforts to push an armed forces agenda at the
expense of a national agenda.
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Even if these military personnel are devoted first to serving government,
there is another problem with having too many officers in leadership posi-
tions. They are often like-minded in their approach to defense and security
planning. This derives from their service in a hierarchical organization where
one set of ideas is disseminated from above and is unquestioned from below.
Implementing such strongly held views while dominating ministerial posi-
tions means that alternative viewpoints may get crowded out.14 What is most
conducive to good defense policymaking is to have some balance of perspec-
tives that encourages a vigorous give-and-take between civilian and military
defense specialists, with the understanding that ultimate policy decisions rest
with elected officials. But all of this is moot if enough civilians are not at the
decision-making table to have their voices heard.
Consequently, to the extent that democratic governments delegate too
many decision-making posts and tasks to military officers within the defense
ministry, that poses a fundamental problem for sound defense policymaking
in a democracy.
Evidence of delegation: Defense ministry posts in six countries
With that in mind, we have analyzed the defense ministries of six well-
known, consolidated democracies: Israel, Taiwan, Spain, the US, the UK,
and France.
Though small, this is a good sample to choose from because we would
expect to see a sizeable civilian presence in top decision-making positions
within the defense sphere. To the extent that we do not, it would call into
question conventional views on delegation and suggest the need for an
alternative explanation.
Why might we expect civilians to dominate the upper echelons of the
defense ministries in these states? There are three important potential expla-
nations that are commonly found in the literature. First, these are all con-
solidated democracies. As Diamond and Plattner state, “If democracy works
in other respects, it is likely over time to bring progress in civil-military
relations as well.”15 As the democratic system advances from transition to
consolidation, authoritarian elements are marginalized, while citizens acquire
an abiding faith in the rule of law and in democratic institutions and their
legitimacy. With stronger citizen support, political leaders are fortified in
their efforts to not only oppose military coercive tactics, but more positively
to fortify civilian control mechanisms. Political leaders should acquire the
confidence they need to tackle second-generation problems of governing the
defense and security sectors, where attention turns to state capacity building,
“the ability of democratic state structures to provide for the effective manage-
ment of the armed forces and defense policy.”16 In short, a consolidated
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democracy is thought to be propitious for the strengthening of institutiona-
lized civilian control measures.
Second, Israel, Taiwan, and the US also face harsh external security environ-
ments, which should enhance the prospects for civilian control.17 The need to
prepare defenses against a formidable foreign adversary should forge unity of
purpose, meaning military elites will work with the political authorities, not
against them. The military will demonstrate respect toward civilians who, under
conditions of heightened external security risks, come to the job well prepared in
defense and national security affairs—as they must—if they are to effectively
confront a foreign adversary.18 One clear implication of the theory is that key
defense institutions such as ministries should be populated with capable civilian
directors and staffers who can demonstrate leadership in the face of crisis. The
incentive to demonstrate capable leadership is all the higher due to the perils of
not doing so.
And third, Spain, the US, the UK, and France are members of NATO, and
membership in that organization pressures nations to make reforms to improve
democratic civilian control over their armed forces.19 The incentive to abide by
NATO standards is derived not just from the added security that comes with
alliance protection, but from the technological aid and cost-sharing arrange-
ments that help make defense reforms possible. Many scholars have argued that
NATO membership has been beneficial for strengthening civilian control and
fortifying civilian-led defense institutions that subordinate the military.20
Hence, considering these explanations, these six countries should qualify
as least likely cases for over-delegation of ministerial tasks and posts to
military personnel. The results of our investigation are shown in Table 1.
Data were compiled on leadership positions, from the minister (or secretary
of defense) on down through assistant or deputy secretaries and directors of
departments. Some positions are necessarily occupied by military personnel
(e.g., chief of staff, deputy chief of staff, and army, navy, and air force
commanders), while others could be occupied by either officers or civilians.
Of particular note are rows 5 and 6, which reveal the proportion of key posts
that are held by civilians. Differences between the first three nations and
the second three are sizeable. The average civilian presence (including neces-
sary military positions) for Israel, Taiwan, and Spain is 22.2 percent, com-
pared to 57 percent for the US, the UK, and France. Excluding mandatory
military posts, the civilian leadership is 36.2 percent for the first three
countries, compared to 85.7 percent for the second three. In short, the first
three countries unexpectedly exhibit serious deficiencies when it comes to
civilian leadership within their defense ministries, while the second three
more predictably show a much stronger civilian presence.
Because the results for the first three countries are unexpected, we explored
these in more detail below. But for purposes of brief comparison, we will also
take a closer look at the US, where over-delegation does not occur.
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Since its founding in 1948, the top job in Israel’s defense ministry has been
occupied by active or retired officers for 46 years, or 66 percent of the time.
In 2018, 17 of the 24 (70 percent) ministerial leadership positions were held
by military personnel. Officers not only directed key defense planning
departments, but also departments that deal with logistics, purchasing and
production, export control, social security, budget, and human resources. Of
the seven civilians who occupy leadership posts, three were in nonessential,
nonstrategic roles.21
Besides delegating ministerial posts to armed forces personnel, the govern-
ment also cedes authority to the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to dominate the
entire defense policymaking process. Civilians are not pressured into this
arrangement; they fully accept it. As Metin Heper and Joshua R. Itzkowitz-
Shifrinson point out, “Overall, the ability of the IDF to influence government
policy has reflected an Israeli acceptance of a civil-military structure that
assigned undue influence to the IDF’s policy demands relative to those of
other branches of government.”22 At an institutional, formal level, political
leaders have control, but at a substantive level that depends on knowledge and
knowledgeable staffers, civilian control loses its validity.23 In the absence of
civilian input, the military filled the vacuum, developing sophisticated analysis
of conflict scenarios. For example, strategic planning is one area least supervised
by civilian government officials. Following the 2004 Intifada, the military
assumed responsibility for this when it became clear that the civilian authorities
were providing no direction as to what the war aims were. Rather than wait
endlessly for directives, the IDF set its own, without civilian objection.24
In Taiwan, 88 percent of defense ministers since the transition to democracy in
1987 have been active or retired officers. The defense ministry is legally endowed
with the powers to fulfill most defense functions, including strategic planning,
resource planning, procurement, and mobilization. With the passage of the
Table 1. Civilian versus military leadership in the defense ministry.
Attribute Israel Taiwan Spain US UK France
Total MOD leadership 24 28 46 127 23 35
Number of necessarily military positions1 0 11 28 37 7 14
Number of military personnel 17 23 37 67 7 16
Number of civilian personnel 7 5 9 60 16 19
% Civilian (including necessarily military positions 29.2 17.9 19.6 47.2 69.6 54.3
% Civilian (excluding necessarily military positions) 29.2 29.4 50.0 66.7 100 90.5
Note: Military = Active Duty + Retired Military Personnel.
1 Positions occupied only by military personnel within the Defense Ministry, such as chief of staff, deputy
chief of staff or army, navy, and air force commanders.
Original dataset compiled using official MOD sources, official gazettes, and government transparency
websites. If the individual profiles of leaders were not available on official government websites, they
were checked online in local press outlets and professional network websites such as LinkedIn.
The list of most heavily used websites are as follows: Israel (http://www.mod.gov.il/), Taiwan (https://www.
mnd.gov.tw/), Spain (http://www.defensa.gob.es/and http://transparencia.gob.es/), US: https://dod.
defense.gov/About/Biographies/Senior-Defense-Officials/, UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/people;
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence; France: https://www.defense.gouv.fr/.
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National Defense Act of 2000, along with the Defense Ministry Organization Law
(DMOL, same year), the ministry’s legal authority has been strengthened.25
However, since that time, active duty officers have occupied senior and midlevel
positions not only in the ministry but in the National Security Council and
National Security Bureau (in charge of intel gathering) as well. Article 15 of the
Defense Ministry Organization Law says that one third of all ministerial posts
should be reserved for civilians.26 Yet it is often the case that those who pass as
civilians are actually retired officers. Because there is nomandatory waiting period
for filling government posts after retirement, Taiwan’s defense ministry is domi-
nated by individuals whose recent background, expertise, mentality, and loyalties
are still very much tied to the armed forces.27
Themilitary turns out to be themain conduit forministerial recruitment. Of the
28 leadership posts with the ministry, only five (18 percent) are held by genuine
civilians. Of these, three are in nonessential (administrative) areas.28 Civilians who
staff the defense ministry are administrative civil servants who come to the job
without defense education or training. The day-to-day affairs of the ministry are
left mainly to active and retired officers who have unchallenged expertise.
Unlike Israel and Taiwan, defense ministers in Spain have been almost all
civilian. The Spanish civilian government is in control of defense policy.29 All
decisions regarding national defense are made by the government, and its
defense ministry is responsible for drafting policy after receiving input from
the military general staff. Reforms implemented by Defense Minister Narcís
Serra (1982–89) under the auspices of Prime Minister Felipe González
(1982–96) empowered the MOD, legally, bureaucratically, and administra-
tively to address all defense policy matters.30
Nonetheless, the MoD leadership is largely militarized, as shown in Table 1.
In 2018, out of 46 positions listed as “defense leadership,” 80.4 percent are
occupied by retired or active-duty military officers, leaving 19.6 percent of
posts for civilians, indicating a reversal of a trend pointed out by a prior study
of the Spanish case.31 There were at least 10 positions that could be occupied
by civilians and are headed by military officers instead. These include the
Secretary-General of Defense Policy who is the deputy minister, Director of
Infrastructure and Equipment, and the Director of the CSEDN (Center for
National Defense Studies), among others. The Ministry has civilian personnel
working there, but their roles are mostly administrative, and it is relatively rare
to see civilians occupying positions that deal directly with defense policy. Of
the nine civilians who hold leadership posts, five are in nonstrategic roles, such
as personnel, law, management of military social services, head of the minis-
terial cabinet, and military education.32
Some experts maintain that the public servant recruitment process in Spain is
to blame for the lack of civilian expertise.33 The government does not bother to
enhance the presence of civilians in top defense ministerial positions either
because they do not have personnel sufficiently trained or because potential
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political appointees prefer other posts. Either way, political leaders seem content
to grant the military a preponderant role in the defense ministry.
The US in comparison
In the United States, civilians are in leadership positions within the Pentagon
and play an important role in the devising of defense policy. Since World
War II only two of 26 (7.7 percent) secretaries of defense have been commis-
sioned military officers shortly before assuming their posts, requiring special
exemptions to the National Security Act in order to serve. All other secre-
taries have been civilian. Below the Secretary of Defense are Undersecretaries,
Deputy Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and Department Directors.
As shown in Table 1, 66.7 percent of these posts are held by civilians.
Examining these personnel more carefully, we can discriminate between
civilians who are in charge of strategic (essential) versus nonstrategic tasks.
The former refers to all those involved in the development of defense policy,
planning, strategy, doctrine—all directly related to the application of force.
The latter refer to those in the supportive areas of administration, finance,
legal affairs, personnel, and so on. In 2018, of 60 civilians in top positions in
the US Department of Defense, 37 or 62 percent were in essential, strategic
positions, and 23 or 38 percent in nonstrategic positions.34 In short, a clear
majority of top posts within the DOD are held by civilians who are involved
in vital defense policy functions.
Why does over-delegation occur?
We surmise that what links the three countries where over-delegation occurs is
the presence of wide and longstanding gaps between military and civilian
expertise and an absence of incentives to close them. Where early on, nations
have knowledgeable military officers coupled with less informed civilians, gov-
ernments will have greater motivation to delegate key tasks to their armed forces
than to invest the time and resources needed to build up a critical mass of
civilian specialists. Early deficits in civilian understanding of defense may have
put some nations on a path-dependent track toward military assumptions of
autonomy and domination over defense ministerial posts later on.
Numerous scholars concur that civilians must demonstrate some competence
in defense and security affairs if they are to assume leadership roles.35 Clausewitz
himself said that “A certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of
general policy.”36 Knowledge confers authority on higher-ups and translates into
decision-making influence. If they are to perform valuable leadership functions,
civilians should come to the job with expertise in hand. It is not likely that civilians
will ever achieve perfect parity with themilitary on defense, nor is that necessary.37
But civilians must know enough about the military’s side of the defense ledger to
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command respect, alleviating any doubts officers may have about the civilian
capacity to lead. They must also know enough to oversee work done by armed
forces personnel, assuring it conforms to the policy preferences of the government.
Moreover, there are areas of overlapping responsibility, where civilians find
themselves sitting across from officers at the same decision-making table and
must be able to hold their own. A key study of the US decision-making process
revealed that with shared defense duties, the knowledge either side brought to the
table translated into real influence.38 In sum, civilians ought to have enough
defense policy knowledge to earn officers’ respect, quiet military apprehensions,
exert oversight, and contribute constructively to the crafting of policy.
Understandably then, where civilians suffer from serious knowledge def-
icits, there is often a temptation to defer to the generals rather than asserting
their own points of view. Deference can lead to delegation, where govern-
ments feel more comfortable in handing ministerial positions over to either
active or retired officers, confident that they will ably design and execute the
nation’s defense plans. If officers establish their expertise early on while
civilians fail to educate themselves, it will be especially difficult to overcome
those deficits in the future.
Though additional research will be necessary to confirm this point, for
now we would suggest that a path-dependent process is set in motion,39
where it becomes increasingly more likely that key positions and responsi-
bilities will be handed over to military officers who are better prepared. The
more tasks that are delegated, the more ownership the military assumes over
its newfound duties, allowing it to lock in advantages by claiming that only it
has the wherewithal to carry out the defense tasks it has been assigned.40 The
longer this goes on, the more difficult it becomes for civilians to claw back
positions and duties they had given away. The military’s accumulation of
expertise makes it increasingly implausible that civilians could ever catch up,
especially if knowledge gaps were sizeable to begin with.
In Israel, Taiwan, and Spain, civilians within the defense sector suffered
from defense knowledge deficits early in the democratization process. For
instance, Israel’s military had decades ago established a firm reputation for
battlefield prowess and strategic acumen, earning for itself unrivaled status
compared to civilians in and out of government. But this was reinforced by
the turn of the new century, when the asymmetric war with Palestinians
posed unforeseen challenges, prompting the generals to devise new modes of
strategic thinking to counter the perceived threat. The military became,
according to Kobi Michael, “epistemic authorities” on asymmetric conflict,
while civilians never mounted their own knowledge-building effort. This
widened the knowledge gap between military and political echelons, allowing
the former to dominate, which in turn weakened civilian control on an
institutional level.41
DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 11
In Taiwan, military figures held important posts within the KMT Party
that ruled the nation uncontested for 40 years, and they enjoyed autonomy in
the making and implementation of defense policy.42 An overreliance on
officers to hold down key policy positions before and after the transition to
democratic rule in the late 1980s has been traced to a “lack of civilian experts
qualified to assume these positions,” according to M. Taylor Fravel.43 Finally
in Spain, civilians had to play catch-up with military experts. According to
Narcis Serra, at the time of the transition, civilian political parties were only
just beginning to study defense and security issues.44 Unfortunately, at the
centers and institutes currently dedicated to the production of defense
knowledge, very few of the faculty and students are civilians.45 Hence, the
civilian defense knowledge deficits persist.
Still, it is conceivable that knowledge deficits could be overcome, were
there a strong enough set of incentives to close the gap by supplying the
institutional resources to invest in training an entire cadre of civilian defense
specialists. Why has this yet to occur in Israel, Taiwan, and Spain?
In countries facing grave external threats such as Israel and Taiwan, there
have been more incentives to delegate defense positions to officers than to build
up a cadre of well-trained civilians. Threats to national security emerged very
early in the nation-building process and have remained with those nations ever
since. Taiwan inherited the Chinese threat as a legacy of Chiang-Kai-Shek’s
retreat from the mainland in 1949. Israel, upon its founding, immediately
entered a geopolitical environment where it was surrounded by hostile states
or political forces. In the event of imminent missile strikes, border incursions,
and even threats of invasion from a hostile neighboring state, there is little time
for deliberation or margin for error. Mistakes are costly, and those with greater
defense expertise are less likely to make mistakes, all else equal.
In such circumstances, we argue that incentives to delegate assignments and
positions to the military are quite high. If military officers are more knowl-
edgeable on defense in such circumstances, then civilians concerned with
preserving the nation in the face of existential perils will see delegation as not
only beneficial, but essential. This is especially true when deficits in civilian
expertise are sizeable and longstanding, as they have been in our cases. To
overcome those deficits would take a considerable amount of time, and time is
a resource in short supply for nations facing serious external threats.
Ironically, Spain’s membership in NATO may provide an inducement for
delegation. NATO puts a premium on defense readiness, assuring that new
members improve their military capabilities as the price for admission.
Aspirants must commit to developing forces that are fully capable of con-
tributing to collective defense and participating in the full range of NATO
missions.46 They must adopt new norms of defense as designed by the older
founding members of NATO. Not to adapt could result in membership
denial, not to mention the loss of economic and technological benefits that
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would derive from being accepted into the “club.”47 Once enrolled in NATO,
there are pressures to maintain standards and readiness so that members can
productively participate in NATO missions.
NATO does stipulate that new members must enhance civilian control, that
the armed forces political power be reduced, and that defense ministries have
authority.48 But demands are generally quite vague, with no penalties for
noncompliance.49 Nowhere is there a rubric set out as to how they should set
up their defense ministries, whether it should be civilian-led, and what the ratio
should be between military and civilian staff personnel.50 Once in, new mem-
bers can do as much or as little as they wish to make unspecified improvements,
and yet reap all the rewards that come with NATO affiliation. There are no
provisions for either sanctioning or expelling members for noncompliance.51
Hence, if the easiest path is to delegate responsibilities to military personnel,
that option is readily available to NATO members, Spain included.
Of course, the US has confronted grave external threats and has been
a founding member of NATO. Why then does it not resort to over-
delegation? The threat posed by the Soviet Union and the fear of nuclear
conflagration prompted civilians to invest very early on in nuclear defense
expertise.52 By the early 1960s, the US had assembled a team of civilian defense
planners and strategists who “exerted their authority [over the military] with
vigor.”53 Civilians maintained their level of expertise for the duration of the
Cold War and beyond. There was much less of a knowledge gap, and thus less
need to delegate defense planning and strategizing to the generals, out of fear
that the nation would be unprepared to confront its adversaries.
Conclusion
Any organizational scheme that does not enhance the position and control of
democratically elected officials and their civilian appointees has failed at one of
its principal tasks in controlling the armed forces and managing defense
affairs.54 This concretely means having nonuniformed personnel in key leader-
ship positions within the defense sector. This article has focused on the imbal-
ance of military versus civilian appointees in leadership positions within defense
ministries of three countries, all of which are advanced democracies. It is found
that a disproportionate number of top posts have been allotted to military
personnel where civilians could have—indeed, should have—been rightfully
assigned those positions. None of these assignments resulted from military
pressure; they were undertaken voluntarily by democratic governments.
These asymmetries could have deleterious consequences, by creating
a dependency on the armed forces personnel that reinforces itself over time,
tempting civilians to continuously defer to military experts. It may also reduce
civilian employment opportunities within government, invite military assertions
of autonomy, and lessens politicians’ confidence that they could ever replace
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officers with equally competent civilians. It is the responsibility of governments
to appropriately divvy up defense positions within the executive branch between
civilians and officers. But delegation becomes dereliction when it places too
many vital decision-making posts in the hands of the military.
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